The Performance of Documentary:
Live Recordings from a Closed System in Marcel Lozinski’s How to Live
an essay by Alina Predescu
Abstract:
Marcel Lozinski’s feature documentary How to Live bends and overturns observational and cinéma vérité conventions in a caustic tale of leisure under socialist rule. The editing shapes the alternate roles of camera as observer, participant and intruder, and builds a representation that stands as the performance of a documentary film. Erving Goffman’s theory of social performativity and Helmuth Plessner’s analysis of community allow for a reading of the formal qualities of the film as necessarily determined by the subject of the representation – that of a society constrained by a system where performance is a form of survival.
Introduction
Journalist and filmmaker Jan Strękowski wrote about the film: “The protagonists did not know that Lozinski controlled several of the key campers, that they were acting and that, consequently, the situations they provoked would be more in place in a feature than in a documentary.” Referring to Lozinski’s method of “opening the reality”, film scholar Krzysztof Kornacki calls How to Live “a documentary with a large number of staging tricks,” while Lozinski declares: “The best thing … is that finally you do not really know what has been staged and what is life.” (Strękowski)
Lozinski’s profilmic world exposes an inherent performative quality. In The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Erving Goffman extends the concept of performance to the social context of everyday life as “all the activity of an individual which occurs during a period marked by his continuous presence before a particular set of observers and which has some influence on the observers.” (22) In How to Live, the dynamic of the social interactions in the camp is such that, at any given moment, a group of people performs before the eyes (or ears) of one or more observers. We distinguish different levels of performances that establish different levels of audiences, while all constitute as many interchanging roles. The board members perform the enforcement of rules by both announcing and enacting them for the audience of the campers. The camp participants, in turn, take on the roles of contestants or objectors as both performers for, and observers of, each other in the officially sanctioned mode of general surveillance. The presence of the crew form the Documentary Film Studio (officially announced during the first meeting) compounds this social performativity as people behavior attests for their awareness of the camera. The camp setting is a social stage whose performative inclination is exacerbated through the filming process. Through the official announcement of the documentary crew’s project, the most distant observer – the viewer of How to Live – is lead to conflate the profilmic production with the film she watches. While at one level the camera acts as audience for the social actors, at another one it becomes the performer for the audience constituted by viewers. In this sense, I will argue, the different roles taken by the camera, enhanced through subtle editing of visuals and manipulation of sound, built up How to Live as a film that delivers the performance of a documentary. Goffman defines the front as “the expressive equipment of a standard kind intentionally or unwittingly employed by the individual during his performance.”(22) Here the performer becomes the film itself, performing for the viewing audience. In keeping a front of documentary mode, Lozinski creates the distance necessary to challenge, and play with, the conventions of the genre, while recuperating the tragic sense of an absurd reality.
The concept of performance induces a distance, or a non-coincidence between the act and its enactment, or in Goffman’s terms, between an activity and its representation. In society, he writes,
In general, the representation of an activity will vary in some degree from the activity itself and therefore inevitably misrepresent it. And since the individual will be required to rely on signs in order to construct a representation of his activity, the image he constructs, however faithful to the facts, will be subject to all the disruptions that impressions are subject to. (65)
According to Goffman, thus, social interaction and communication come down to an exchange of various performative representations that stand for as many constructions of reality. In How to Live, these social tendencies are exacerbated by the summer camp’s organizational frame as a scaled socialist community. Through the mechanical incorporation of ideologically-informed regulations, the camp recalls the ideal-based community theorized by Helmuth Plessner as “an achievement-based community with absolute equal justification of all founded equally in the unity of the spirit” and that finds its limitations when confronted with individual realities of life. (95) Forced to reconcile their everyday situations with the form imposed on their lives, the people find themselves trapped in a perpetual in-between, a space accounting for the pervasive disjunction between their, and the official, reality. The ability to perform, thus, becomes a necessary skill in navigating a deceptive context where activities, settings and situations are never what they seem to be. As both observer and participant, the documentary camera takes the liberty of its own expressive performance. In line with the semantic ambiguity of the profilmic activities, Lozinski’s filmic representation goes around its announced and implicitly assumed documentary form, in order to express a critical attitude from within the space between “what has been staged and what is life.” How to Live proposes to the contemporary socialist spectators a look at the distance between how they live and how they should live.
Camera as Observer
Tomorrow morning we have a solemn camp opening. Your presence is obligatory. You are all required to wear your uniforms. The first order will be announced tomorrow. You must remember that this is a camp, by no means to be treated as a holiday. This is a leisure and training camp. We are here to spend time on activity and training. Parents are requested to take care of their kids and quiet them down as they disturb you and the organizers. We hope that you will observe the discipline that we will try to impose.
While for the viewers of the film these words sound absurd and incommensurate with the context, the campers have a different reaction – seemingly distracted, possibly bored, acting like they have heard these things before, they glance apathetically in different directions, some of them chatting and smiling softly, while their kids are roaming around the room. This attitude speaks for the behavioral adaptation to a system where the concept of ‘leisure’ is reappropriated and repurposed: “Virtuous socialist leisure was understood in communist morality as productive or reproductive activity. […] Socialist leisure was charged with realizing the untapped potential of the working classes for self-development.” (Crowley and Read, 33) Over decades, the empty rhetoric of slogans against a background of needs and dysfunctions leveled the public’s expectations into a resigned apathy. Thus, what appears as absurd for the film viewer sounds as plain routine-rhetoric for the meeting participant. Charles Eidsvik identifies this blazé attitude as a source of culturally informed comedy:
To a Western viewer, the first experience of viewing Eastern European film comedies in the company of Eastern European is apt to be unsettling. Often, the films do not appear to be comedies in the usual American sense. […] In Eastern Europe, the mood of humor is ignited by an appreciation of the ridiculousness inherent in futile plans and hopes. (91, 103)
The comical quality of the sequence comes from the incongruity between the official tone of the spoken message, and the listeners’ reactions as a form coping mechanism with the institutional frame and an expression of an interiority at odds with the cartoonish roles assigned to them. Helmuth Plessner assesses the role of form in the public realm of human communication: “The observation of the forms has the same meaning as following rules of a game, through which public life – the persons who appear to each other in functions, in roles – becomes in its unique nature a game.”(134) During the public meetings and gatherings, the camp participants cannot freely adopt roles other than the ones strictly assigned – as if following rules for a different type of game, a public enactment of a tightly controlled performance in which people have no liberty to navigate between different social positions. But, as Plessner beautifully asserts, “an elementary physical need, a play drive [Spiletrieb], governs the organic world. Even human relations must do justice to this drive (consciously or unconsciously), regardless of whether it concerns cheerful or serious life situations.”(146) If the participants seem untouched by the absurdity that rings loudly in the ears of the external viewer, they do not remain inert and dead-faced either, as their liveliness seems triggered by sources originating in this play drive. The incongruence between the façade they strive to maintain and the bursting of life refusing the constraint of form recalls Plessner’s understanding of the source of ridicule as “pure emotion – free expression of the soul, its direct articulation, genuine absence of restraint in the manifestation of the judgment, as well as in actions or facial expressions.” (117) In a paradoxical way, these public gatherings allow for a maximum freedom of behavior within a controlled setting, as people retain the ability to be themselves when in a group, despite the expectations of them ‘playing’ their assigned roles. The figure of authority is deemed derisory, there is no real sense of threat – the viewer thus indulges in the comical contrast, while she possibly recognizes many of the participants’ attitudes as familiar. In this scene, while the camera movements and the editing preserve the feeling of a documentary recording, the manipulation of sound in relation to the visuals suggests the first act of the film’s performance as a documentary. What is revealed, besides the oppressing setting of the camp, is the dynamic of a collective, yet passive, form of resistance.
Camera as Participant
Andrzej: The jurors should observe daily life in all its aspects. In sociology, it’s called participant observation. You could, of course, learn about how the spouses relate to each other by asking them directly… But why do that? If you could, for example, eavesdrop on their conversation at lunch…
Zyman: It is great that it leads to a close day-to-day observation of oneself, one’s family, as well as of other families. And although as jury members we will remain anonymous, this may put us nonetheless under a degree of pressure. But I think we’ll win this one, take the bull by the horns. We’ll bear the burden of responsibility because in the end…
Andrzej: I think it’s damn important because what will follow from this endeavor is how to live. We want to model it and demonstrate that we care. That it’s a sort of school of life – social, political life… in all its aspects.
Later, during a public call, the camp participants are informed of what is expected from them. They will be observed on certain aspects of marital life, on their attitude towards their own and others’ children, on how they treat their spouses. They are encouraged to submit written comments about what they see or experience using the especially installed comments box. While they “are requested to behave as usual, as they normally do,” they are offered “in exchange” (sic!) “a big prize,” that however is divulged only in terms of its unusual money value.
Here we see the emergence of multiple layers of performance. At the profilmic level, the whole contest is framed as a performance game. The people are requested to behave “as usual,” while at the same time they will be rewarded only if they perform successfully the roles assigned to them as members of the model socialist family – in this context thus, pretense, spying and informing on others are not just encouraged, but rewarded. The contradiction between the (privately declared) ideological scope of the contest – the modeling of “how to live” through “a school of life” of sorts -, and the (publicly announced) material incentive of an expensive object outside the affordable range of most of the members, suggests another type of performance triggered by a systemic malfunction with deeper roots, as Ina Merkel explains:
[O]fficial consumption policies attempted to serve both interests [of the ideal of rational consumption norms and collective ownership of property as against individual requirements and expectations], but ultimately all decisions were made according to the priorities of economic policy. These were often in opposition to communist ideals and tacitly promoted something that should actually have been a matter of contention: the individual striving for possessions and for distinction. (61)
In the socialist community of the camp, this “individual striving for possessions and for distinction” is disavowed in the closed-doors meeting when Banachowski warns against people’s inclination to buying favors, but is publicly endorsed through the alluring offer of an attractive award to be won by one, individual, couple. As such, the goal of the competition has a dual character, as it is differently stated for distinct audiences – while it has to be ideological for the purpose of the rhetoric within the leaders’ circle, it becomes consumer-oriented in the practical context of the people’s interaction, recalling Plessner’s incompatibility between the envisioned functioning of the ideal-based community and the individual realities of life. (95)
From observer of the settings, the camera becomes gradually a participant in the camp activities and in the contest, engendering at its turn different types of performance. Initially, the camera adopts the participatory style of cinéma vérité, as it accompanies two board members while they approach a couple busy with cleaning their summer cabin to interview each spouse separately. The framing emphasis on close ups, the jerky moves of camera with rushed pannings from one subject to the other and sudden zoom-in adjustments, as well as the interview participants’ openness and casual manners (through the lighting of cigarettes together) create a sense of spontaneity and documentary authenticity that legitimizes the camera’s presence and softens the intruding character of the questions. When asked if they quarrel with each other, the interviewees give contradictory answers which leave them vulnerable to the judge’s assessment of their performance as a couple. Under the appearance of a friendly documentary interview lies the subtext of an aggression meant to cancel the private sphere of the couple, and to perturb the balance of their intimacy. Here the camp is shown as a community in which the expectation is “the complete renunciation of the individual without remainder” and where “the emotional connection to all arises not from the participation in a secret withheld from other persons, but from the consciousness that there must not be any secrets withheld from each other at all.” (Plessner, 87)
The climate of pervasive surveillance induces a subtle absurd dynamic that is made visible within the transparent documentary appearance through another type of camera performance. Throughout a consistent pattern, the camera catches as if by chance the characters that structure the film’s narrative. While never shedding its documentarian mask, the camera films events, meetings or seemingly random activities from angles that capture, somewhere in the background or in a corner of the frame, always the same characters passing by or interacting in a telling way. The editing enhances these carefully constructed chance images through shot/counter-shot sequences that suggest virtual spaces and connections often based on supposed lines of sight, and that result in different combinations of cognitive and affective viewer reactions. The family of three from chalet 43 (I will refer to them as Rozhin family, as they are identified in the film’s end credits) gradually becomes the focus of the narrative. The editing suggests that they can see from their cabin the setting and beginning of the public meeting. While the camera is seemingly recording the meeting proceedings, they walk into the frame as they arrive late and somehow disturb the audience listening to the announcement of the contest. Besides this little commotion, the camera follows the somewhat smiley expressions on their faces, their awkward movements to get in line, and the whispered exchange between the spouses – all these against the background of the camp director’s speech detailing the types of familial interactions observed as criteria for the contest. Their behavior is thus framed as different, and standing out as daring in a context where the expectation is of conformity. Later throughout the film, Zyman would repeatedly approach Mrs. Rozhin, the woman from the misbehaving family, with unsuccessful attempts at interrogating her about her family life. Each time, the camera, unlike in the cinéma vérité style interviews, would stay at a distance and enhance the uneasy feeling of the interaction. At the same time, while Chairman Zyman becomes more convincing in the sneaky role of the stalker, his zealous performance has the effect of increasing the couple’s non-participatory resistance.
Camera as Intruder
Some of the most disturbing moments of bending and blurring of documentary conventions take place during the interviewing of children. Defenseless and socially immature, the children offer accessible entry points into the intimacy of the families. In society, Plessner believes, “the soul needs to be clothed with form so that it also remains on the surface what it is in its invisible depths.”(119) However, he admits the existence of psychological beings that can express themselves without the armor of the form, and that can successfully support the risk of ridicule.
[T]he simplicity of our inner being – completely plain, elemental and given immediately – takes the weapon of irony out of our hands through its absolute vulnerability, its lack of assertion. Total unintentionality, simplicity, and honesty in self-experience and expression, as well as the ultimate plainness of feeling, willing and thinking in which we are all rooted belong to what is necessary in order to create this kind of effect. (120)
The children are exactly these psychological beings, vulnerable because they wear their souls on their sleeve, not yet knowing how to take on a mask or adopt a role otherwise necessary to fend the risk of ridicule. The Board members take advantage of this, and assault them with painfully intrusive questions. The film carefully composes its documentary performance: on the one hand, the camera hides beyond branches, or stays at a safe distance not to distract the little ones, while capturing their testimonies that are heart-warming in their honesty. On the other hand, both Andrzej and Zyman are skilled impersonators of their own disgraceful roles (if we don’t recognize them from previous films made by Lozinski, their names are disclosed on the film end credits as part of the few acting participants), but their performance is chilling in its collapsing of the distinction between abuse and its representation. The actors put on here a double performance, a performance within another performance – we see them as playing the Board members, who, in turn, pretend to be friends with little Klaudyna in order to obtain from her information about her parents. The striking contrast between this layered masking and the naked vulnerability of the girl stands as a repulsive incongruity that threatens the viewer, and that recalls Goffman’s assertion:
Paradoxically, the more closely the impostor’s performance approximates to the real thing, the more intensely we may be threatened, for a competent performance by someone who proves to be an impostor may weaken in our minds the moral connection between legitimate authorization to play a part and the capacity to play it. (59)
The Board members are here skilled impostors that use the power of their functions as moral legitimization for their deceiving performance. More than taking advantage of the children’s lacking of a buffering, performative zone, or social distance, the interviewers attempt to create a negative distance by penetrating the private sphere of the families intruded upon.
However, the Rozhin couple resists this attempt, as Mrs. Rozhin repeatedly fends off Zyman’s sneaky approaches, and asks Andrzej to stay away from her daughter. This family affirms its right to privacy, and insists on keeping a distance from the public life of the camp. As if fascinated by their difference, the camera abandons its documentary position and follows them in a private conversation on the water deck. Oblivious of the filmic device (that is only momentarily acknowledged by the girl), they talk about the struggle of enjoying their leisure time together in this camp that feels like a farce, like a circus, and for which there is no alternative. This moment gives weight to the family’s overall attitude of reluctantly participating in the camp imposed activities – they chose to enjoy and make the most of their holiday time at the price of their public image. Unlike the rest of the camp participants who comply with the leveling roles assigned to them, the Rozhins stick to their individuality as a family and to their freedom of choosing what roles to play, and when to play them. But this behavior is seen as problematic in the camp community expected to function as one, extended and self-regulating family. Goffman so theorizes the challenges faced by social innovators:
If the individual takes on a task that is not only new to him but also unestablished in the society or if he attempts to change the light in which his task is viewed, he is likely to find that there are already several well established fronts among which he must choose. […] Since fronts tend to be selected, not created, we may expect trouble to arise when those who perform a given task are forced to select a suitable front for themselves from among several quite dissimilar ones. (27, 28)
The family is publicly reprimanded because it maintains a front that affirms a distance not allowed in this type of community. With these characters, Lozinski introduces a negative zone, an alternative space where people take on roles that have no correspondence in the surrounding reality of the camp. What for the Rhozyns is a conscious, assumed attitude, for the camp leaders is an unmeant gesture to be publicly attacked and farther prevented – a mechanism interestingly explained by Goffman:
The crucial point is not that the fleeting definition of the situation caused by an unmeant gesture is itself so blameworthy but rather merely that is different from the definition officially projected. This difference forces an acutely embarrassing wedge between the official projection and reality, for it is part of the official projection that it is the only possible one under the circumstances. (52)
In this sense, the bubble in which the Rozhins survive is a virtually inexistent space, as it is unconceivable under the given circumstances, and as such, it cannot be accessed by an officially sanctioned documentary camera. The filmic device recording this virtual family is freed from any profilmic authority, but mediates Lozinski’s prescriptive intervention in this cinematic recipe for life – namely, the suggestion of a serious consideration of the necessity for safeguarding one’s human dignity inside an overwhelmingly abusive system.
Conclusion
So, while frozen on the viewer’s face, is the smile also frozen in time? What is left from a puzzling film claimed as a documentary by its author, taken as a threat by the Polish censors of the time, and frantically recuperated within recent screenings of Lozinski’s works? Through an arguably unequalled reworking of documentary conventions, Lozinski holds up to the viewer a disturbing mirror in which she sees more than her own reflection. With an accuracy allowed only by the work of imagination, the film documents the timeless danger posed by the conformity to any abusive system that deceives its subjects into complacent submission.
Bibliography
Crowley, David, Susan Read. “Introduction” in David Crowley and Susan E. Reid, ed. Pleasures in Socialism. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2010. Print.
Eidsvik, Charles. “Mock Realism: The Comedy of Futility” in Andrew Horton, ed. Comedy/Cinema/Theory. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. Print.
Goffman, Erving. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Anchor Books, 1959. Print.
Merkel, Ina. “Luxury in Socialism” in David Crowley and Susan E. Reid, ed. Pleasures in Socialism. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2010. Print.
Morris, Pam, ed. The Bakhtin Reader. London: Edward Arnold, 1994. Print.
Palmer, Jery. Taking Humour Seriously. London: Routledge, 1994. Print.
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Strękowski, Jan. “Marcel Lozinski.” March 2004. http://culture.pl/en/artist/marcel-lozinski